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Abstract 
The debate on waterboarding and the wider debate on torture remains fiercely 
contested. President Trump and large sections of the US public continue to support 
the use of waterboarding and other so-called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ as 
part of the ‘War on Terror’, thus putting the anti-torture norm under pressure. This 
article demonstrates that the re-imagining of waterboarding as ‘torture-lite’ is 
contradicted by the long history of waterboarding itself. Examining pre-modern uses 
and descriptions of torture and waterboarding, this article highlights that the post-
2001 identification of waterboarding as a relatively benign interrogation technique 
radically inverts a norm that has predominated for over 600 years. This historical 
norm unequivocally identifies waterboarding not only as torture but as severe torture. 
The article highlights the value of historically contextualizing attitudes to torture, 
reviews how and why waterboarding was downgraded by the Bush Administration, 
reveals the earliest explicit description of waterboarding from 1384, and argues that 
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the twenty-first-century re-imagining of waterboarding as torture-lite is indicative of 
the fragility of the anti-torture norm. 
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Historicizing waterboarding as a severe torture norm 
 
Among the American political elite, support for waterboarding and other so-called 
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs) waned after 2009, when President Obama 
stated: ‘I believe that waterboarding was torture…whatever legal rationales were 
used, it was a mistake’.1 In contrast, American public support for torture, including 
waterboarding, has increased steadily since 2001.2 Polls from 2009 and 2011 indicate 
that over 70 percent of the US public believe that torture can be justified in 
exceptional circumstances.3 Even after the 2014 Senate Intelligence Committee 
Report categorically established that EITs had not been effective in detainee 
interrogations, US public opinion maintained that torture generated ‘valuable 
intelligence’ and supported its use ‘by almost 2-1 margins’.4 In comparison to global 
averages, Americans are more likely to believe that torture is ‘part of war’ and that 
enemy combatants ‘can be tortured to obtain important military information’.5 
The debate on waterboarding and the wider debate on torture remains fiercely 
contested. The 2016 presidential campaign and election of Donald Trump reignited 
the controversy over the employment of coercive interrogation by US intelligence 
agencies and armed forces. Trump appealed to and fostered an underlying public 
support for waterboarding during his 2016 campaign, promising that he would ‘bring 
back a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding’,6 and urging that ‘waterboarding is 
absolutely fine but we should go much further’.7 Responding to the June 2016 
Istanbul airport bombing, Trump announced: ‘I like it [waterboarding] a lot. I don’t 
think it’s tough enough’. The reason for this, he explained, is that: ‘We’re living in 
medieval times…We have to fight so viciously and violently because we’re dealing 
with violent people, vicious people’.8 Trump’s election as president indicates that 
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many Americans approve of such statements or are simply indifferent to the US 
government’s employment of waterboarding. 
Trump's invocation of 'medieval times' as a synonym for viciousness and 
violence taps into widespread perceptions of medieval society as singularly barbaric 
and cruel; often posed in contrast to "enlightened" modernity.9 This construct of the 
Middle Ages includes assumptions about the widespread and almost casual use of 
torture, with torture being the ‘most notorious aspect of medieval culture and 
society’.10 However, as will be shown, medieval attitudes regarding torture were far 
from simplistic and waterboarding was clearly categorised as a form of torture as 
early as the fourteenth century. Premodern evidence can therefore act as a corrective 
to modern attempts to reimagine waterboarding as 'torture-lite'. In downgrading 
waterboarding as a non-torturous interrogation technique, the Bush administration – 
and now potentially the Trump administration – permitted a practice that was openly 
recognized as torture during the Middle Ages. Thus 'violent' medieval society is 
revealed to be more cautious in its approach to waterboarding than post-9/11 
America. 
Whether President Trump will seek to fulfill his election promise and 
reinstitute waterboarding remains to be seen – there are certainly obstacles in his 
path.11 Attorney General Jeff Sessions reversed his former approval of waterboarding 
during his January 2017 Senate Confirmation Hearing, asserting that waterboarding 
was now ‘absolutely improper and illegal’.12 CIA Director Mike Pompeo asserted that 
he would ‘absolutely not’ authorize interrogation techniques not approved by the US 
Army Field Manual.13 Regardless, President Trump has restated his approval of 
waterboarding, asserting that ‘we have to fight fire with fire’.14 
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The willingness to justify waterboarding goes hand-in-hand with its 
characterization as ‘torture-lite’: unpleasant, but not real torture and not illegal. This 
phrase can be found throughout academic literature and the popular media.15 
Arguably, increased media exposure has desensitized the public to torture and eroded 
moral sensibilities.16 The now open acknowledgement that waterboarding was 
occasionally incorporated into US armed forces Survival, Evasion, Resistance and 
Escape (SERE) training has encouraged a public impression of waterboarding as 
something less severe than torture.17 Public perception that military personnel have 
been routinely waterboarded feeds a belief that (a) terrorists deserve at least the same 
treatment, and (b) the technique must be relatively harmless. However, the creation of 
this fallacy risks a corruption of public discourse based on the illusion that 
waterboarding is ‘professional, restrained, and far removed from the brutal practices 
of authoritarian and tyrannical regimes’.18  
This article seeks to establish that the image of waterboarding as torture-lite is 
contradicted by the history of waterboarding itself. Examining pre-modern uses and 
descriptions of torture and waterboarding, this article highlights that the post-2001 
identification of waterboarding as a relatively benign interrogation technique radically 
inverts a norm that has predominated for over 600 years. This norm unequivocally 
identifies waterboarding not only as torture but as severe torture. 
A historically informed understanding of waterboarding is imperative because 
the anti-torture norm is increasingly under pressure.19 The charade of actively 
employing but publically denying the practice of torture (rebranding it ‘torture-lite’ or 
‘enhanced interrogation’) is highly damaging to the credibility of the anti-torture 
norm, as well as being morally, legally, and politically self-destructive.20 The 
willingness of the US (and UK) to condone a practice that was openly recognized as 
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torture from at least the fourteenth century suggests either wanton dissimulation or 
worrying ignorance at a governmental level. It should also induce a sense of shame 
and, as Steele suggests, may encourage a process of ‘reflexive discourse’.21 More 
immediately, the identification of the waterboarding torture norm should inform 
contemporary judgments regarding the illegality (and immorality) of the technique. 
The first part of this article briefly outlines some advantages of situating torture 
within a longue durée and offers a working definition of the term ‘waterboarding’ 
used throughout the article. The second part reviews how and why waterboarding was 
downgraded by the Bush Administration to a form of enhanced interrogation between 
2001 and 2008, and why waterboarding specifically is vulnerable to being re-
imagined as ‘torture-lite’. The third part turns to pre-modern attitudes to torture, 
focusing on a reported episode of torture contained within a fourteenth-century 
English chronicle. This episode from 1384 is the earliest explicit description of 
waterboarding to be identified thus far. In the final part, I conclude that the inversion 
of the waterboarding torture norm is indicative of the fragility of the anti-torture 
norm. 
 
A long view 
Placing waterboarding within a long historical context might invite charges of either 
presentism or antiquarianism. Yet torture has long been a diachronic conversation and 
practice in the West: Roman law deeply influenced medieval jurisprudence and 
judicial process; medieval legal traditions were adopted and adapted by early-modern 
jurists; and Enlightenment scholars and lawmakers self-consciously rejected torture as 
yet another proof of their “modernity” and superiority over their forebears. As cultural 
and legal heirs of the Enlightenment, contemporary Western society continues to 
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interact with this trans-historical phenomenon. Scholars can ‘agree with, dispute, 
adopt, modify, mobilise and simply reflect upon ideas generated by thinkers’ that 
precede us,22 but that need not imply a careless misinterpretation of those ideas in 
their original context. We can (to the best of our abilities) contextualize historical 
ideas and practices while also considering how they help us to think about 
contemporary issues. If nothing else, this can aid our understanding of how and why 
certain norms have evolved, persisted, or perished over time. 
A long view can highlight the ways in which the recent discussion and 
utilization of waterboarding has reflected pre-modern historical trends. Perhaps most 
notable are justifications of “necessity”, although even in antiquity such justifications 
were embedded within discourses that cast serious doubt on the credibility of 
information extracted through torture. 
Utilising a range of pre-modern evidence further highlights the ways in which 
International Relations scholarship can expand its sometimes narrow canon of 
sources. The benefits of broadening the canon and adopting an approach that is 
sympathetic to historical contextualisation have recently been discussed in this 
journal.23 In the field of warfare and just war studies there is a strong and persisting 
influence of the medieval and early modern traditions.24 The pre-modern roots of 
modern institutions and political and legal thought have been considered at length.25 
‘Neomedievalism’ is now an identifiable analogue within IR thought (albeit one that 
often lacks historical veracity), and arguably contributed to the reintroduction of 
waterboarding by the neoconservative Bush administration.26 
A historical view is also important because the language we use to describe 
waterboarding has a range of implications, not least, legal. Identifying waterboarding 
as torture matters because torture is illegal and breaches both American domestic law 
8 
 
and international law. Revealing a long-standing historical norm that identifies 
waterboarding as torture clearly challenges modern attempts by the US Department of 
Justice (DoJ), Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
to create a legal grey area by reimagining waterboarding as non-torturous. This was 
followed by conservative commentators presenting waterboarding as something 
unpleasant but fundamentally different to torture.27 Historical contextualization 
should reinforce the modern illegality of waterboarding, and this is fundamental in 
preventing the practice becoming institutionalized. 
It remains legitimate to ask whether we can meaningfully compare pre-
modern examples of waterboarding with the techniques used by the CIA and others in 
the twenty-first century. The physical and cultural contexts are obviously very 
different. Nevertheless, there are sufficient commonalities to justify direct 
comparison. In referring to waterboarding, I assume a technique which includes the 
following characteristics: 
1) A common operating procedure, including forcing the victim into a supine 
position, covering or stuffing the mouth, mouth and nostrils, or entire face with some 
type of textile, and pouring water over the face in order to suffocate the victim and 
induce the sensation of drowning. 
2) Ends-driven objectives – that the physical actions described above are 
intended to persuade the victim, either to provide information or to spur them to 
action (e.g. providing a confession, collaborating, etc.). 
Variations of waterboarding – forcing water directly into the mouth of a 
supine victim without using a cloth (what Rejali classifies as ‘pumping’28) – I refer to 
as ‘waterboard-like’ techniques. The waterboard technique employed in SERE 
training adheres to both the procedural and strategic elements of the definition above 
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(trainers attempt to “break” students). Of course, the key difference is consent. SERE 
students consent to be waterboarded and sessions are strictly limited, far removed 
from the ‘large number of applications’ experienced by certain Al Qaeda detainees.29 
Within hostile environments, factors such as helplessness, humiliation, and fear for 
one’s life play a much more powerful role, and may enhance the experience of 
suffering.30 Each specific episode of torture, regardless of time or space, has its own 
unique identity; individual victims and torturers possess idiosyncrasies that will shape 
experiences of torture, thus qualifying any attempt to neatly categorise suffering. 
Consequently, I am not claiming that the waterboard produces an experiential 
uniformity, but I am claiming that the procedure and objectives of the waterboard are 
historically directly comparable, and therefore we can expect some degree of 
experiential comparability among victims. Put simply, if waterboarding was 
considered torture by medieval and early-modern victims and torturers, there is good 
reason to think that waterboarding should be considered torture in the twenty-first 
century. 
 
Downgrading waterboarding and raising the bar for suffering 
History offers a number of attempts to define torture. As a term, ‘torture’ has become 
increasingly nebulous, meaning many different things to many different people, 
dependent on a multiplicity of factors.31 While modern academics may distinguish 
between interrogational and terroristic, legal and extralegal, or public and private 
torture, the deliberate infliction of pain and suffering – usually for the purpose of 
extracting information or a confession guilt – has been the constant, from antiquity to 
the present day.32 Both the United Nations Convention against Torture and the United 
States Code characterize torture as ‘severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
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mental’.33 This built on the Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution, prohibiting 
‘cruel and unusual punishments’, which was, in turn, adopted from the English Bill of 
Rights (1689).34 
The legal process through which EITs were approved within the Bush 
administration between 2001 and 2008 has been examined in detail.35 At no point did 
the Bush administration publicly condone torture; rather, President Bush declared: 
‘This government does not torture people…We stick to U.S. law and our international 
obligations’.36 However, after 2001, definitions of torture were given increasing 
attention by the DoJ and CIA. A series of memos produced by the OLC between 2002 
and 2005 reviewed whether ten EITs (including waterboarding) violated American 
obligations under domestic and international law.37 Exploiting the interpretative 
ambiguities of defining suffering, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee’s claimed 
‘that certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still not produce pain and 
suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within §2340A’s proscription against 
torture’.38 Unsatisfied with a subjective or contextualized concept of suffering, Bybee 
sought a concrete analogue to objectivize the concept of severe pain. To constitute 
torture, pain must be of ‘an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious physical 
injury such as death or organ failure’; severe mental pain must constitute ‘lasting 
psychological harm…like posttraumatic stress disorder’.39 Bybee subsequently 
concluded that a ‘significant range of acts…fail to rise to the level of torture’.40 This 
restrictive and highly contentious interpretation of pain and suffering served Bybee’s 
immediate purpose of creating a legal grey area in which coercive techniques might 
escape classification as torture.41 Yet the OLC’s ‘systematic and reasoned 
misinterpretation’ of American domestic and international legal obligations regarding 
torture has been described as ‘torturing the law’.42 
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As early as 2002, the CIA and DoJ were arguing that waterboarding did not 
cause physical pain or severe suffering, therefore it could not be defined as torture 
‘within the meaning of the statute [§§2340-2340A]’.43 It was proposed (in stark 
opposition to international law44) that the lack of a specific intent to inflict suffering – 
demonstrated by due diligence of care during interrogation sessions – would 
exculpate interrogators from the crime of torture.45 An extremely severe definition of 
torture was constructed based on a number of domestic US court decisions pertaining 
to US Code §§2340-2340A. In particular, Mehinovic v. Vuckovic was used as a 
paradigmatic case of torture proper. The victim suffered beatings to the genitals, head 
and body with metal pipes, removal of teeth, breaking and dislocating of bones, 
having figures carved into the skin, denial of food and water, and games of Russian 
roulette.46 Such treatment patently constitutes torture. But if one takes this as a base 
level for defining severe pain and suffering, then the bar has been set very high 
indeed. By using extraordinary cases of torture, and presenting them as normative of 
torture proper, government attorneys attempted to present waterboarding as relatively 
benign by comparison, not capable of the requisite level of suffering to be legally 
defined as torture.47 
The ‘raising of the bar’ approach was combined by a blinkered denial of the 
severity of waterboarding itself. Testifying before a House Judiciary Committee in 
2008, Assistant Attorney General Stephen Bradbury insisted that waterboarding was 
not akin to ‘the “water torture” used during the Spanish Inquisition…but was subject 
to “strict time limits, safeguards, restrictions.”’ He claimed that, ‘The only thing in 
common is, I think, the use of water’.48 Bradbury also rejected any comparison to the 
use of waterboarding and waterboard-like techniques on American prisoners-of-war 
during World War II, for which a number of Japanese guards were subsequently 
12 
 
convicted of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.49 Given that the operating 
procedure of waterboarding is almost identical across time, Bradbury’s claim was 
either insincere or ill-informed. Even if one were to accept that the technique 
approved by the DoJ was substantially more restrained than historical precedents, the 
CIA Inspector General concluded that the Agency’s use of waterboarding ‘went 
beyond the projected use of the technique as originally described to DoJ’.50 The 
duration and frequency of sessions, as well as the amount of water used, were all 
increased in the field.51 
 
Not ‘lite’ torture 
The lack of external physical scarring or mutilation produced by waterboarding has 
been crucial to its modern characterization as ‘torture-lite’.52 The fact that it can be so 
easily hidden has made it highly attractive to democratic governments, who value the 
deniability of ‘stealth’ techniques.53 Waterboarding clearly inflicts less obvious harms 
than mutilation. However, medical and psychological research shows that the degree 
of physical violence experience by torture victims, as well as any long-term physical 
scarring, is a poor indicator of the severity of the effects of torture on the victim.54 A 
survey of torture survivors from the former Yugoslavia found that ‘physical pain per 
se is not the most important determinant of traumatic stress in survivors of torture’.55 
Internal damage can be caused by waterboarding and suffocation is itself a pain-
producing sensation.56 But assessing waterboarding principally on the basis that it 
leaves no external scarring is to misconstrue the nature of this particular torture 
technique. The efficacy of waterboarding is its capacity to produce an experience of 
drowning, stimulating the “mammalian diving reflex” by filling the airways (rather 
than the lungs) with water, thus causing asphyxiation and severe panic. Put simply, 
13 
 
waterboarding can kill, and to describe waterboarding as merely ‘the perception of 
drowning’ or a ‘sense of suffocation’ detracts from the potential lethality of the 
technique.57  
Waterboarding is also distinctive in its capacity to quickly induce a sensation 
of impending death. The ‘poor wretch is in the same agony as persons ready to die’, 
as a seventeenth-century Dutch chronicler described waterboarding.58 The French-
Algerian journalist, Henri Alleg, recalled the ‘insupportable agony’ of being 
waterboarded by French soldiers during the Battle of Algiers (1957): ‘I had the 
impression of drowning, and a terrible agony, that of death itself, took possession of 
me.’59 The British journalist Christopher Hitchens, who voluntarily subjected himself 
to waterboarding, offered the same conclusion.60 In producing a sensation of 
imminent death, waterboarding shares some of the trauma induced by mock execution 
– illegal under US domestic law and international law61 – and the CIA’s own OMS 
report notes that Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is one possible outcome of 
waterboarding.62 Ironically, this actually fulfills Bybee’s requirement of torturous 
suffering to be pain ‘akin to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as 
death’.63 
 
Pre-modern torture 
The association between violence and the Middle Ages is commonplace. Serbian 
forces were condemned of ‘medieval barbarity’ during the Kosovan War, while the 
prosecution at Slobodan Milošević’s trial at the International Criminal Tribunal 
accused him of ‘almost medieval savagery’ – thus implying that even systematized 
torture, rape, and murder falls short of medieval cruelty.64 A former detainee of 
Guantanamo Bay described being ‘tortured in medieval ways’.65 As noted above, 
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atrocities committed by ISIS and other terrorist groups cause President Trump to 
believe that we are living through ‘medieval times’. The link between extreme 
violence and the Middle Ages is also ubiquitous in popular culture, encapsulated in 
video-game franchises such as Assassin’s Creed or medieval-esque novels and 
television like Game of Thrones. Even the starkly post-modern film Pulp Fiction 
contains a disturbing scene in which torture involving ‘a pair of pliers and a blow 
torch’ is described as getting ‘medieval on your ass’.66 Such representations of the 
medieval reflect and appeal to widely held assumptions that medieval Europe 
epitomized a brutal and cruel period of human history; torture plays a central role in 
this image of a brutal Middle Ages. The brutality of medieval society, contrasted 
against our own enlightened present, is a powerful ideological construct and taps into 
strong Whiggish elements in the reading of history. Even an otherwise nuanced 
sociological analysis offered by Norbert Elias informs us that in the Middle Ages the 
‘pleasure in killing and torturing others was great, and it was a socially permitted 
pleasure.’67 More recently, we have been reassured that the ‘better angels of our 
nature’ are progressively restraining the violent proclivities of our pre-modern 
selves.68 Medieval societies were brutal in many ways.69 But they were not uniquely 
so, and the modern construct of medieval barbarity both distorts historical reality and 
flatters our own sense of liberal progressiveness. The degree and nature of humanity’s 
irenic advancement is more complicated and contestable than Pinker suggests.70 
Torture provides an example of the potential brutality but also the caution and 
moral conflict at the heart of medieval violence. The use of torture within medieval 
judicial systems was subject to extended jurisprudential analysis and strict regulation. 
The primary function of torture during the Middle Ages was to elicit the ‘truth’ – that 
is, to extract a confession of guilt. Azo of Bologna (fl. 1150-1230) stated that: 
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‘Torture is the inquiry after truth by means of torment’.71 Torture was not intended to 
force an innocent person to confess, but rather to reveal what ‘no innocent person can 
know’, according to a sixteenth-century German ordinance.72 A lack of evidence 
makes it impossible to determine how frequently torture was used in secular courts in 
the period c. 400-1200, although the public judicial torture (racking and flogging) of 
slaves is prescribed in Clovis’s sixth-century Pactus Legis Salicae and repeated 
verbatim in Charlemagne’s eighth-century Lex Salica Karolina.73 With the 
abandonment of trial by ordeal from the late twelfth century, torture was increasingly 
employed on the Continent, where judicial systems dominated by Roman law 
emphasized the importance of incontestable proof (and therefore confession) prior to 
sentencing.74 By 1252, the Latin Church approved the use of torture in the 
interrogation of heretics.75 In the common law jury-system of England there is little 
evidence of torture being employed prior to the early fourteenth century, although this 
does not preclude its practice. 
Debates about the utility and morality of torture date back well beyond the 
Middle Ages. Aristotle observed that ‘those under compulsion are as likely to give 
false evidence as true…wherefore evidence from torture may be considered utterly 
untrustworthy.’76 Similarly, Roman law warned that ‘confidence should not always be 
reposed in torture...as the evidence obtained is weak and dangerous, and inimical to 
the truth’.77 Notwithstanding these reservations, torture was practiced in both ancient 
Greece and Rome because it was believed that extreme coercion is unique in its 
ability to reveal truth, therefore it remained an essential tool in the spheres of justice 
and security. The conviction that torture is a necessary evil is explicit in the Christian 
outlook of St. Augustine and this mirrors medieval and, it would seem, prevailing 
modern beliefs about the utility of torture.78 Arguments in defense of torture have 
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always relied upon its perceived necessity. The so-called ticking time-bomb scenario, 
to which many scholars find a utilitarian solution persuasive, challenges moral 
prohibitions of torture.79 In contrast, critics of the time-bomb case claim that the 
scenario is so divorced from reality that any moral, much less legal or political, 
conclusions drawn from it are of minimal importance.80 Evidence such as that 
collected by the 2014 US Senate Intelligence Report also strongly indicates that 
torture simply doesn’t work in the effective way that most people assume; quite the 
opposite, in fact.81 Many ancient, medieval, and early-modern jurists understood that 
torture’s utility was restricted to ‘confirming what they already knew’ (extracting a 
confession based on compelling evidence) and that it was almost useless as a means 
of gathering information.82 The latter, of course, was the sole purpose for which 
waterboarding was utilized by the US after 2001. 
Recognizing the potential risks of torture – both to innocent persons and the 
pursuit of justice – medieval jurists devoted considerable attention to the 
circumstances of its use. This went hand-in-hand with a growing emphasis on judicial 
due process, embodied within the ordo iudiciarius. Kenneth Pennington observes that 
medieval and early modern jurists ‘believed that torture was a flawed instrument’ and 
used it cautiously.83 As a result, torture was strictly limited and it ‘never became an 
accepted and normal part of criminal law in every case’.84 Between the twelfth and 
fourteenth centuries, jurists, city-states, and kingdoms stipulated that torture could 
only be used in cases involving serious crimes, that there first had to be convincing 
evidence of guilt against the accused, and that certain members of the population were 
immune from torture.85 Similar restrictions appear in criminal ordinances produced in 
seventeenth-century France. Notably, these French regulations forbade suggestive or 
leading questions being put to the victim during torture.86 Medieval jurists even 
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classified the threat or fear of violence as a form of torture, something which the UN 
Torture Convention fails to include.87 Jurists were also concerned that torture should 
not lead to permanent damage of the victim’s body. As a result of the clerical 
prohibition against shedding blood, there was a particular concern within canon law 
that torture should ‘not endanger life or limb’ or become ‘a judgment of blood’.88 
Such concerns regarding bloodshed and mutilation contributed to the widespread use 
of the corda/strappado/estrapade/mannacles89 and the waterboard. In spite of these 
precautions, when French jurists rewrote the criminal code in 1670, they ‘expressed 
two specific objections’ to torture (which commonly included waterboarding): that it 
did cause permanent physical harm and that it did not obtain the truth.90 
Slaves, criminals, heretics, Jews, the poor and the ‘base’ were among those 
most likely to be tortured, even as witnesses. These internal “others”, existing on the 
periphery of “civilized” society, were deemed inherently untrustworthy and subject to 
different treatment.91 This echoed Greek and Roman attitudes, and disturbing parallels 
to the modern treatment of non-state actors, terrorists, and minorities hardly needs 
stating. As Huysman and Steele suggest, the ontological security of the state 
transforms such persons into ‘concretized dangers’, allaying the fears of the majority 
but ultimately endangering significant portions of the state’s own population.92 
Notwithstanding the careful demands of the jurists, in practice the use torture 
did not always adhere to such specific limitations. Torture was undoubtedly a means 
of “truth” extraction, but it was also a means of punishment, persuasion or 
intimidation (of victims and their associates). None of these functions were mutually 
exclusive, as is the case today. Public demonstrations of torture as a punitive measure, 
especially as a precursor to certain forms of capital punishment, were widespread. 
These displays of punishment – ranging from chaining criminals to the stocks to 
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hanging, drawing and quartering – made torture part of the public consciousness. The 
public’s exposure to pain-inducing techniques was intended to terrorize and to deter 
potential malefactors. Moreover, the infliction of pain as punishment was thought 
appropriate as a public spectacle because it was a way for authorities to communicate 
that justice and social order were being upheld. It also enabled the public to 
participate vicariously in the punishment of malefactors who had injured the 
community in some way. As such, pain was ‘viewed as a force for betterment’, for the 
victim as well as for the community.93 
Beyond the judicial system, torture was commonly employed during wartime 
operations, often against civilians. A fifteenth-century French bishop complained that 
even royal troops had ‘raped women and girls…captured priests, monks, clergy, and 
labourers; put them in shackles and other instruments of torment called “monkeys”, 
and then beat them, by which some were mutilated while others were driven rabid and 
lost their mind.’94 Illegal uses of torture such as this remained ends-driven: it largely 
aimed at extracting money or enforcing a power hierarchy, and should not be 
dismissed as mere sadistic pleasure.95 
Thus it was a combination of legal, extra-legal, and illegal uses of torture, 
either debated, reported, or directly experienced, that formed medieval public opinion 
about torture.96 Torture was not employed casually or haphazardly during the Middle 
Ages – despite modern images to the contrary – but it was enough of a reality that 
medieval assessments of what constitutes torture should be taken seriously. 
 
A severe torture norm 
Most of the earliest references to waterboarding or waterboard-like techniques date 
from the late fifteenth century. There were variations, but the supine position of the 
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victim and the pouring of water over the face or into the nose were integral elements; 
a cloth was sometimes used but not always, and could be inserted into the mouth or 
used to cover the mouth and nostrils. Invariably, waterboarding was viewed as a 
severe torture technique. In the 1480s, Franciscus Brunus observed in his Tractatus de 
indicijs et tortura that some torturers ‘force water down the nose, and some also insert 
a stone to block the drinker’s mouth. This type of torture, I have heard, is dangerous, 
for the suspect may suffocate.’97 In 1490, the Spanish Inquisitor Pedro de Villada 
ordered that “la toca” (toca being a fine cloth or gauze) be used in the interrogation of 
Benito García, but only after the victim had undergone 200 lashes.98 Given the 
escalating nature of torture processes, the authorities clearly viewed la toca 
(waterboarding) as more severe than flogging. 
Further trial records show that in 1494, Spanish Inquisitors tortured Marina 
González of Toledo, placing ‘a hood in front of her face, and with a jar that held three 
pints…they started to pour water down her nose and throat’; this torture was repeated 
several times, using at least six pints of water.99 In 1513, María González of Ciudad 
Real was subjected to the same torture, enduring several jars of water. The 
desperation of María is obvious in the fastidious recording of her pleas to the 
inquisitors during the waterboarding:  
 
“I speak the truth, I have spoken the truth, I have already spoken the truth, I 
speak the truth, what I have said is true, I am telling the truth, I do not tell any 
lies, I have not lied, I have spoken the truth, I have spoken the truth.” The jar of 
water was finished. She said she had spoken the truth.100 
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By the mid-sixteenth century, the French legal handbook Praxis Criminis 
Persequendi contained descriptions of suspects being interrogated using the 
waterboard, with the 1541 edition even containing an engraving of a supine victim 
with a cloth draped over his mouth, undergoing what the rubric describes as ‘Torturae 
Gallicae Ordinariae’ (‘Standard Gallic Torture’).101 This demonstrates that 
waterboarding was a routine technique within the French judicial system by the mid-
sixteenth century and highlights Rejali’s error in identifying the use of cloth to 
asphyxiate in water torture as being a seventeenth-century Dutch innovation.102 As we 
shall see, the use of cloth predated even the Praxis Criminis by two centuries. The 
waterboard continued to be a common form of judicial torture in France well into the 
late eighteenth century, where it was named le question d’eau. In 1726 a certain Jean 
Bourdil was forced to endure the estrapade four times, followed by the question 
extraordinaire (question d’eau) five times, during which his face was ‘covered by a 
linen napkin’ and as much as sixteen liters of water was poured into his throat.103 
Earlier references to waterboard-like torture can be found in European legal 
treatises from the late fourteenth century. Bonifacius de Vitalinis (d. 1388) described 
when a victim has ‘had cold water poured…into his nose, or was subjected to the leg-
screw, as is very often done’.104 Vitalinis saw no conceptual distinction between the 
waterboard and the leg-screw, bracketing them together as severe forms of 
interrogative torture.105 In the records of criminal trials from the Châtelet de Paris 
(1389-92), there are numerous references to prisoners being ‘put to the question’ 
(mise à question) on ‘the small and large trestle’ (le petit et le grant tresteau).106 The 
records provide scant details regarding the exact physical procedure, but we can 
extrapolate from eighteenth-century French accounts that the difference appears to 
have been that trestles of varying height were wedged under the prisoner’s back 
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whilst he was bound by the hands and feet in a supine position. The greater the height 
of the trestle, the more acute was the angle of the victim’s body and the more severe 
the pain when water was applied to the face.107 Interrogations always began on the 
‘small trestle’; if it was deemed necessary, they were then escalated to the ‘large 
trestle’, on which victims could be subjected to multiple sessions.108 
In contrast to the rather oblique and opaque references to water torture found in 
the French legal records, the Westminster Chronicle offers a rare and explicit 
description of waterboarding being practised in England during the 1380s. The 
Westminster Chronicle covers the period from 1381 to 1394 and owes its name to the 
Benedictine Abbey of Westminster, London, where it was composed.109 It contains a 
vivid description of the torture of a Carmelite friar named John Latimer in 1384, 
culminating in the use of the waterboard. This is the earliest explicit description of 
waterboarding discovered to date, predating Rejali’s historical examples by more than 
a century.110 
The chronicle recounts how Latimer accused John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, 
of being involved in a ‘treasonable plot’ against his nephew, King Richard II. Upon 
further questioning the friar had a change of heart and ‘immediately shammed 
insanity’.111 The friar was dismissed from the king’s presence and escorted by the 
royal chamberlain and steward to be put into the custody of the keeper of Salisbury 
castle.112 Unfortunately for Latimer, he was met by ‘a party of knights…who vowed 
that they would make the friar confess who had prevailed upon him to tell his story’. 
These knights were associates of John of Gaunt and assumed that Latimer was merely 
the puppet of a more powerful enemy of the duke.113 The torture of the friar was 
therefore aimed at securing intelligence, not a confession. 
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The Westminster Chronicle provides a lengthy description of Latimer’s 
interrogation in Salisbury castle.114 A range of tortures were employed and, 
importantly, the severity of torture was gradually amplified in response to the friar’s 
refusal to name his presumed accomplice(s). To begin, the knights ‘passed a rope over 
a beam, tied the friar’s hands behind him, and, hanging from his feet a stone weighing 
as much as two bushels of wheat [about 100 lbs], hauled him up by the rope so as to 
make him dangle, suffering torturing pain, in mid air’. Latimer apparently endured the 
strappado ‘with the patience of a servant of Christ’, and so the interrogators 
‘proceeded to yet crazier excesses and brutally swung him to every corner of the 
room, alternately bearing him down and tossing him high and adding no little, through 
bruises of various kinds, to the distress of his frail body.’ When this also failed to 
produce results, Latimer was hoisted over a fire. Then, adding ‘outrage to outrage’, 
his torturers hung a heavy stone from his genitals, which ‘violently wrenched sinews 
and veins’.115 And the abuse continued: 
 
They now took him down and forced his feet and the whole length of his shins 
up to the knees to rest for some time on the fire…[so that] a number of heat-
cracks were plainly visible on his feet and shins until the day of his burial. 
Finally they made him lie on his back and poured over his face, which they 
covered with a sheet, three gallons or more of hot water, pressing him 
repeatedly the while to confess who it was who had arranged for him to prefer 
so serious a charge against such a great noble; but the friar, sorely distressed 
and exhausted as he was by his wrongs and sufferings, did not trouble to answer 
their questions.116 
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The brutal treatment of Latimer is shocking, but perhaps equally shocking is 
the clarity of the description of waterboarding. The use of hot rather than cold water is 
an incidental, not a substantial, variation of the technique. What is particularly 
striking is that the torture of Latimer escalates towards the use of the waterboard. The 
amplification of pain is a standard feature of the torture process, still practiced in the 
modern world.117 The horrors inflicted upon the friar intensify as he fails to provide 
his interrogators with the information they want. He is hoisted,118 his genitals are 
stretched and torn, his feet and legs are burned, and at last he is waterboarded. The 
sense of the passage is that the waterboard is the finale of Latimer’s suffering, after 
which the duke’s men are forced to give up. This may be compared with the case of 
Benito Garcia given above, who was waterboarded only after receiving 200 lashes. 
Another example of techniques analogous to the waterboard being utilised as an 
amplification of torture can be seen in the case of William Lithgow, a Scotsman 
tortured by the Inquisition in Malaga in 1620. After being stretched on the rack, 
Lithgow then had water poured down his throat, which he describes as, ‘a suffocating 
pain…the water reingorging itself, in my throat, with a struggling force, it strangled 
and swallowed up my breath from yowling and groaning’.119  
The perceived severity of the waterboard and its ability to produce pain is 
attested by early-modern French judicial distinctions between the question ordinaire 
(the estrapade) and the question extraordinaire (the question d’eau/waterboard). 
Male prisoners were subjected to the question ordinaire before being subjected to the 
question extraordinaire, while women were usually spared from the question d’eau 
altogether. In 1651 the diarist John Evelyn was illegally admitted into the Chatelet de 
Paris to witness a torture session, describing the prisoner as being ‘to all appearances 
dead with paine’ after the waterboard.120 Perhaps most indicative of the severity of 
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waterboarding is the pain produced by what was deemed the “lesser” torture of the 
estrapade. Records from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Toulouse tell us that 
one prisoner was ‘raised’ by the estrapade twice, and this was enough for him to 
exclaim: ‘You’re killing me wrongly’; another begged for death after being ‘raised’ 
three times. Yet another had the fortitude to endure the estrapade four times, denying 
all charges, but immediately began to confess after just one application of the 
question d’eau.121 In a more recent French example, Henri Alleg was waterboarded in 
1957 after first enduring electric shock torture.122 
Here we must pause briefly and ask the question: should we believe that 
Latimer’s torture really occurred? The chronicler was not an eyewitness, and the 
account includes obvious parallels to torments suffered by saints in medieval 
hagiographies. The narrative also betrays political overtones, especially implicit 
criticism of the duke of Lancaster. The violent interrogation of friar Latimer, if true, 
was certainly illegal. The interrogators acted independently of any judicial capacity 
and had no authority to torture the friar. The king was apparently ignorant of the 
abuse suffered by the friar and disapproved of it when informed.123 However, it is 
notable that the torture of the friar follows conventional late medieval judicial torture 
procedure quite closely, beginning with the strappado and culminating with the 
waterboard. Importantly, the historicity of the episode is bolstered by three additional 
contemporary sources recording the torture and death of the friar.124 All repeat 
distinctive features of the friar’s torment, such as being suspended from the ceiling, 
the use of weights, and the mutilation of his genitals. The criticism of Gaunt’s 
henchmen as torturers is also unequivocal: ‘They were the judges, they were the 
serjeants, they were the torturers’, as Thomas Walsingham (d. 1422) put it.125 Only 
the Westminster chronicler provides a specific description of waterboarding, but his 
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source was probably the keeper of Salisbury castle, who may have been an eyewitness 
to, or complicit in, the events described.126  
If not an eyewitness account, the description of waterboarding may have been 
added by the Westminster chronicler to enhance the dramatic narrative of suffering, 
drawing from some pre-existing knowledge of the technique. It seems highly 
implausible that the chronicler simply invented waterboarding from thin air, hitting 
upon a remarkably accurate description of the technique through a fluke coincidence. 
Whether a faithful eyewitness account or a literary flourish to exaggerate the torture 
sequence, both point to waterboarding being relatively common during the fourteenth 
century. The duke’s henchmen were aristocratic men-at-arms, not professional 
interrogators; yet these members of the knightly elite knew enough about 
waterboarding to incorporate it into their interrogation. Alternatively, if the 
waterboard was a fiction of the chronicler, then we must wonder how a Benedictine 
monk, cloistered within an abbey, was able to give such an accurate description of the 
technique. The obvious conclusion is that knowledge of waterboarding and 
recognition of its status as a severe torture existed openly in the fourteenth-century 
English public sphere, and that the history of waterboarding must therefore predate 
1384. 
 
Conclusion 
These medieval and early modern perspectives on torture and waterboarding establish 
three things very clearly. First, medieval attitudes to torture were far from simplistic. 
Judicial torture, which included waterboarding, was subject to intense academic 
debate and juridical regulation; but torture could also be utilized by the state or others 
to compel obedience or to satiate a public desire for justice. In the vast majority of 
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cases torture was strategic and its use restricted; it was not a sadistic pleasure 
indulged in by medieval “barbarians”. As the episode of friar Latimer illustrates, 
torture was used with the objective of extracting highly valuable political information. 
His torturers followed the conventional amplification of pain in proportion to 
Latimer’s resistance.127 Second, waterboarding has a long history, dating back to at 
least 1384, and the technique has not changed markedly over time. This makes direct 
comparison between pre-modern and modern waterboarding possible. Third, during 
the medieval and early modern periods, waterboarding was recognized as a severe 
form of torture – a technique that was judged more severe than flogging, racking, and 
the strappado. It was normative that waterboarding was a form of torture 
extraordinaire – a finale of the torture process, not a beginning. Moreover, this norm 
remained uncontested even during the twentieth century: the US prosecuted Japanese 
prison guards in 1946 for waterboarding American POWs; the Khmer Rouge used the 
waterboard to torture political prisoners in Cambodia during the 1970s.128 
These conclusions inform the modern debate about enhanced interrogation and 
torture in a number of ways. Most obviously, they seriously challenge and undermine 
modern representations of waterboarding as ‘torture lite’. One assumes that even 
ultra-conservative commentators or law-makers in the US would baulk at condoning 
flogging, racking, or the strappado as lawful interrogation techniques. Yet, 
historically, these were all considered “lighter” torments than the waterboard. 
Taking a long historical view of waterboarding starkly reveals that the attempt 
to reimagine waterboarding as a non-torturous enhanced interrogation technique, used 
by dispassionate professionals, is essentially an attempt at myth-making. This myth-
making was promoted through official government channels as well as through 
popular media. But waterboarding must not be sterilely termed an ‘enhanced 
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interrogation technique’. It should not be permitted on the basis that it is ‘torture-lite’. 
Waterboarding is torture, and as noted at the beginning of this article, the language 
used to describe waterboarding is crucial because torture remains illegal under 
international law and the domestic law of liberal democracies, including the United 
States. Those who authorise or employ waterboarding are breaking the law and are 
liable to criminal prosecution. Hopefully, this criminal liability may deter those who 
may otherwise be tempted to once again incorporate waterboarding into interrogation 
procedures. 
Important studies have already drawn attention to international pressures on 
the anti-torture norm.129 The history of waterboarding can also tell us something about 
the current health of this norm, although the conclusions are potentially contradictory. 
On the one hand, the re-imagination of waterboarding as torture lite can be taken as 
evidence of the prevailing force of the anti-torture norm. The unwillingness of the 
Bush administration to be seen to violate the norm led them to expend considerable 
resources in order to present their coercive interrogation practices as conforming to 
the Torture Convention. This capacity – to oblige even the global hegemon to tie itself 
in knots in order to conform (albeit superficially and anti-historically) – may be taken 
as evidence of the anti-torture norm’s abiding influence.  
On the other hand, while the Bush administration and CIA may have been 
compelled to disguise and re-imagine waterboarding, that did not prevent its use. The 
relative ease with which waterboarding was reintroduced at an institutional level, and 
the continuing support it enjoys among large sections of the US public and the current 
White House incumbent, is evidence that the anti-torture norm is remarkably fragile. 
Perhaps this should come as little surprise. The anti-torture norm is, in historical 
terms, a youthful anomaly. Legal and extra-legal torture is the dominant norm in the 
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longue durée, and that norm continues to be dominant in much of the world today. 
One might also observe that the abolition of torture (including waterboarding) in the 
West was never absolute: imperial powers simply removed it to their peripheries, to 
be used against “uncivilized” enemies or colonial subjects.130 In 1968 The 
Washington Post could publish a front-page photograph of a US soldier 
waterboarding a Vietnamese prisoner, commenting that the technique was ‘fairly 
common’.131 
However, by refusing to acknowledge basic facts (i.e. that waterboarding is 
torture), the recent ‘enhanced interrogation’ narrative risks weakening the anti-torture 
norm to a point of fracture, placing liberal democracies on a slippery slope towards 
the erosion of combatant and civilian immunities. The actions of the Bush 
administration and, to a lesser degree, President Trump, indicates that the anti-torture 
norm has become something to be manipulated and even contested. If so, this so-
called ‘norm’ lacks robust normative force, and is little more than a liberal façade 
hiding an ugly reality of torturous practices. 
There is no reason to assume that modern democracies are immune from the 
kind of ‘torture creep’ experienced in imperial Rome, whereby a practice initially 
restricted to the legally dispossessed came to be extended to all free people of the 
empire.132 Indeed, the CIA Inspector General’s 2004 report on the Agency’s 
interrogative activities provides clear evidence of torture creep, with extreme coercive 
techniques quickly becoming normalized and resisting operational safeguards. Such 
techniques went beyond those sanctioned by the DoJ and were applied ‘without 
justification’.133  
During ‘states of exception’, extraordinary measures justified in defence of the 
state can quickly be transposed into measures that ensure the stability of the state, thus 
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entering the domestic criminal justice system.134 Indeed, the insidious normalization 
of torture within the US domestic sphere is already observable. At an institutional 
level, accusations of illegal interrogation techniques against ethnic minorities have 
been levelled against the Chicago Police Department, with the senior police detective 
also involved in illegal interrogations at Guantánamo Bay.135 Perhaps even more 
shocking, in 2017 a Pennsylvania couple were ‘charged with waterboarding their 12-
year old daughter as a form of punishment’.136 Historical precedent unequivocally 
demonstrates that systems which incorporate torture have never successfully 
implemented effective safeguards to protect the innocent. 
The popular bravado of President Trump on the issue of waterboarding 
indicates that many people remain ill-informed regarding the severity of 
waterboarding and/or unconvinced of the illegality or moral impermissibility of 
torture. The anti-torture norm is ‘seen as a moral luxury in some circles’, with claims 
that politicians have to make ‘sacrifices of value’ to protect their communities.137 
Underlying this public and academic acceptance of torture is the belief, despite clear 
evidence to the contrary, that torture works and that it is necessary because it works 
better than any other interrogational method. Regardless of profound doubts and 
misgivings, this belief in the unique efficacy and thus necessity of torture is a belief 
that societies seem unable to shake: from Aristotle to Augustine, from medieval 
jurists to twenty-first-century OLC attorneys and Hollywood filmmakers, the 
conviction – or rather, fiction – endures that torture is necessary to defend justice and 
society.138 This article has demonstrated that waterboarding is torture, but while 
society continues to be lulled by the torture-fiction, the anti-torture norm remains in 
peril. 
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